were swift to precipitate in the flight of their own capital too. This sequence prompted the realisation that developed nations need to maintain uninterrupted flow of financing toward the developing countries. In the autumn of 1985 the then US Secretary of the Treasury announced the so-called 'Baker Initiative' in which he stressed the importance for debtor countries to be seriously engaged in their economic restructuring measures while he called for creditors to be flexible in providing neu' money to an extent that would permit debtors to sustain growth. The Japanese government accepted the initiative positively as one that addressed the issue rightly; i.e. making a dynamic approach placing an emphasis on enabling the debtors' economies to be active and helping them return to the reproductive spiral. To date, this dynamic approach has not changed as the mainstay in Japan's debt strategy, in the belief that developing economies have a fair chance to attain a path of self-sustaining growth if they follow the lessons particularly of the Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) which proved their potentials by achieving and maintaining healthy and, indeed, remarkable growth through raising exportoriented industries.
1f there was a weakness in Mr. Baker's concept, it was perhaps in the degree of expectation and the selection of method for the commercial banks' tolerance in providing new money while putting up bad-debts provisions for the same debtors. In parallel to such evolution, there were on-going efforts by the government of Japan to accelerate the increase of its Official Development Assistance -a medium-term plan to increase it to an equivalent of 1 per cent of GNP, or to US$50 bn, within a five yearperiod, shortened from the original seven years, and in
May 1987 there came 'Emergency Measures', an announcement comprising principally the 6,000 bn yen-worth of measures to stimulate domestic demand on the one hand and a programme to have US$20 b& of the accumulated current account surpluses rechannelled (recycled) to the developing areas in the world on the other. The latter, named the 'Recycling Programme', has become one major and yet unique source of new money in the context of international efforts to tackle the world debt problem.
Japan's Fund Recycling Programme
The First Round
As already said, the programme had a size of US$3Obn to be implemented from the three years ending with Japanese fiscal year 1989. It was decided that: (a) the recycled money should take the form of loans, except for the part made by way of the government's direct contribution to the multilateral development banks (MDBs), (b) the entire funds provided should be fully untied -their uses not tied to purchases of goods and services from Japan, (e) in providing public funds under this programme, private funds should be encouraged to come with them so that the whole recycling effect could be enhanced, and $20 bn), subscriptions to MDBs' capital replenishment (IADB, Asian Development Fund; approx. $3.9 bn), loan to the ¡MF (approx. $3.6 bn), etc. As seen above, except for the part handled directly by the government itself, the programme's implementation has been commissioned to two governmental institutions, the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). While the OECF's responsibility is easily identifiable as Category B-2 (more than $3 bn), the JEXIM was originally designated to handle a minimum aggregate of$9bn (Categories B-1 and C) and later took charge of providing a SDR 2.2 bn loan (US$3.0 bn-equivalent) to the ¡MF for its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which falls under Category D. Where, then, are these funds actually to be applied? A part of the programme, Categories A and D, goes to the MDBs for their repletion of operational resources, be it to their ordinary capital resources or certain funds set aside for special operations. Categories B and C are applied to the selected priority projects and/or the most imminent structural adjustment policy packages of developing countries and areas. In the programme's operation, particularly in the latter (the so-called policy based lending = PBL), it is recognised that the application of funds to the most objectively needed areas often requires special efforts to do it correctly, for example inducing recipients to choose a difficult and occasionally unpopular project! policy option, ensuring the consistent and exact execution of the agreed project/policy, and, by no means less importantly, ensuring the use of funds tobe in a truly untied manner.2 For these reasons and because Japan's bilateral agencies wish to avoid any appearance of domestic intervention, co-financing and co-working with MDBs is found to be realistic and, indeed, considerably helpful. Sometimes questions are raised regarding the use of the JEXIM as a major player in implementing the programme. Many such questions are based on an understandable yet incorrect comprehension of the character of the bank; i.e. it would be reasonable to expect JEXIM tobe similar to the many export import banks in the world which are preoccupied with the task of promoting the respective nation's exports. If this view were correct, there would be no conceivable reason for the JEXIM to be involved in this Recycling Programme other than the concealed expectation that the programme would be effectively helpful to Japan's further exports. However, JEXIM is substantially different from many similarly named institutions in other countries for it has long been operating not only export credit but also other actual functions; i.e. import credit (traditionally financing natural resource development overseas and, lately, offering a promotional facility for manufactured imports: use of credit therefore is not linked to Japanese goods and services), overseas investment credit (financing Japanese direct investment overseas, particularly toward developing countries; untied to Japanese exports) and it has indeed a legal provision3 under which it has been making loans to overseas borrowers for their necessities to import supplies freely from anywhere in the world provided that such import were for specifically agreed projects -'untied loans'. The bank has thus been acting as a multi-function longterm lender, not only for the cause of Japanese export. It had a good reason therefore to be chosen to play the main role in the Recycling Programme, dealing with developing countries' development financing. At the same time, however, there are areas under the programme that the bank is not so familiar with; e.g. dealing with the lower-income developing countries (those often called the 'Pure IDA Countries') and, especially, the basic infrastructural projects in these countries; and therefore those countries and types of projects are set aside to be handled by the OECF.
The Extended Round InJuly l989,just prior to the 'Arch Summit' and when the Recycling Programme was more than 90 per cent accomplished in terms of concrete commitments with eight months left in the programme period, the Government of Japan announced the expansion of the ongoing programme and an extension of the period. The extended programme was given an aggregate of 'more than $65 bn' in size and a programme period of five years toward end-FYI991 (inclusive of the original $30 bn for the three years). The incremental $35 bn is classified into the following three categories (Category names correspond to those of the original Programme, and this classification was redone by the author for readers' ease). Category A $14.5 bn (government)
Article t8-8 of the banks statute.
Category B, C $16.Obn (JEXIM/OECF loans) Category D $4.5 bn: JEXIM's loans specially made in parallel to the medium-term facility of the IMF.
Notable in this new, stepped-up programme is its inclusion of a pledge of $4.5 bn 'parallel lending' to accompany the IMF's medium-term facility, which would be provided when a medium-term structural adjustment programme is agreed upon with the debtor as part of the 'Brady Initiative' (or the 'New Debt Strategy') announced just a few months before. Under the New Debt Strategy-based packages to help Mexico and the Philippines, the JEXIM has committed $1,000 mn-and $300 mn-equivalent respectively as loans in parallel with the IMF credits (the former, in addition to the JEXIM's $1.05 bn loan in co-financing with the World Bank). It should be remembered, however, that even in such New Debt Strategy operations the JEXIM's untied loans cannot be made as a resource with which the recipient can 'buy-back' or otherwise dispose of its existing debts but can be provided only to -finance the debtor countries' ordinary imports (excluding arms and a few other specifically negative-listed items) in accordance with the bank's statutory restriction.
Conclusion -Still a Long Way to Go
Aside from the above outline of Japan's official initiative in injecting net additional financial resources, there is a positive recognition of the constructive role that foreign direct investment can play in the broad context of the debt strategy. It becomes more evident when we take this foreign direct investment into account that the success of these debt strategies relies upon how the debtor countries endeavour to create an environment of confidence which will be required to attract new loans and foreign investment. The debt reduction scheme, although it has finally been admitted into the latest debt strategy, is the last concession that commercial bankers can offer, and can give only a marginal solution to the whole magnitude of the debt problems of developing economies in the world. It is a persistent fear that such a concession might cause a moral hazard discouraging those countries which are seriously and therefore painfully struggling to restructure their economies.
Should such countries as Indonesia, Turkey, Colombia, etc., among others, who are exerting all their powers to resist the external debt burden and to meet existing obligations, fail to keep doing so, it will mean not only that all past efforts concerning those countries will go down the drain but also that the international financing system will end up carrying more insolvent assets than it can bear. Thus, one should always remember the needs of these better performing countries, keeping financial flows going to them and providing them with as favourable an environment as possible -particularly in keeping the interest rates of key international currencies low.
As for the countries whose external debt problems have been revealed, both the debtor countries and their creditors should avoid taking a short-sighted view simply to evade present debt burdens. They need a longer perspective in order to build up a structure that will enable the economy to expand after the restrained, equilibrium-aimed measurcs. These can be coped with only by a dynamic approach by the creditors. and with the presence of willing donors.
There has been and still will be the so-called 'Vicious Circle ofPovertv' in many developing economies; i.e. a low level of standard of living causing a low rate of domestic savings, then a low rate of domestic investment that allows only low productivity, thus
bringing about yet lower living standards -a 74 mechanism which obliges the economy to resort to external financing when an investment becomes necessary, and thus is likely to cause the external debt servicing burden to grow. Altogether, the new debt strategies have a long way to go, in pain and with patience for at least some of those involved, on case by case bases -a way which cannot and should not be avoided under present circumstances. Japan is determined to bear its share, and is calling for others to do so, while the JEXIM is meeting the challenge of dealing with a great number of requests from interested governments and institutions concerning its untied loans under the Recycling Programme. Such a volume of work occasionally requires even the bank to make organisational and institutional adjustments in addition to maintaining its inevitable closer vigilance as a bank over its own asset profile.
